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WHY COUNTING VOTES DOESN’T ADD UP:
A RESPONSE TO COX AND MILES’ JUDGING THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT
Ellen D. Katz∗
Anna Baldwin∗∗
In Judging the Voting Rights Act, Professors Adam B. Cox and Thomas
J. Miles report that judges are more likely to find liability under section 2
of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) when they are African American,
appointed by a Democratic president, or sit on an appellate panel with a
judge who is African American or a Democratic appointee. Cox and
Miles posit that their findings “contrast” and “cast doubt” on much of
the “conventional wisdom” about the Voting Rights Act,1 by which they
mean the core findings we reported in Documenting Discrimination in
Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since
1982,2 and a related study by one of us, Not Like the South?: Regional
Variation and Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2.3
This assertion is puzzling given that Cox and Miles’ findings do not
conflict or cast doubt on ours. Our studies found that obstacles to
minority political participation remain more prevalent in “covered”
jurisdictions (i.e. places that, under section 5 of the VRA, must obtain
approval from federal officials before changing their voting laws and

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Emma Cheuse,
Daniel Halberstam, Bill Miller, J.J. Prescott, Scott Shapiro, Mark West, and Chris Whitman
for comments, and to Charles Doriean for statistical work.
** J.D., Mich. 2006.
1. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 5 (2008).
2. Ellen D. Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, Final Report of the Voting Rights
Initiative,
39
U.
Mich.
J.L.
Reform
643
(2006),
available
at
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/votingrights/files/finalreport.pdf [hereinafter Katz et al.,
Documenting Discrimination].
3. Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and Political Participation
Through the Lens of Section 2, in Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006:
Perspectives on Democracy, Participation and Power 183–221 (A. Henderson ed., 2007),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/ewi-old/research/votingrights/vra/
ch%208%20katz%203-9-07.pdf [hereinafter Katz, Not Like the South].
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procedures) than in non-covered regions.4 We found that plaintiffs
bringing section 2 claims have been more likely to succeed, and courts
hearing these claims more likely to document a history of official
discrimination, extreme racial polarization in voting, and a lack of
success by minority candidates in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones.5 These findings bolster the argument that the need for
preclearance persists and support Congress’s 2006 decision to
reauthorize section 5.
Cox and Miles do not dispute our finding that section 2 plaintiffs
have been more likely to prevail in covered jurisdictions than elsewhere.
Nor do they contest our finding that courts hearing section 2 claims in
covered jurisdictions have been more likely to make certain subsidiary
findings—such as finding extreme racial polarization in voting and a
lack of minority electoral success—than were courts in non-covered
jurisdictions. Cox and Miles do not focus on section 2 judgments or the
findings underlying these judgments, and instead direct their attention
to the varied votes individual judges cast in the course of section 2
litigation. Using this lens, they observe that the individual votes judges
cast in section 2 cases in covered jurisdictions were no more likely to
favor liability than the votes they cast in non-covered ones. Based on this
observation, Cox and Miles conclude that coverage does not matter.6
The observation about votes is correct but the conclusion is not. To
be sure, the votes Cox and Miles counted do not, standing alone, show
that covered jurisdictions “still have more voting rights problems” than
non-covered ones.7 But no good reason exists to suspect that they would.
Counting votes by individual judges rather than examining final
judgments may well illuminate a number of issues, but as a lens through
which to compare covered and non-covered jurisdictions, counting votes
promises at best a skewed vision of “voting rights problems” in these
regions.
Votes and Judgments: Lawsuits challenging electoral practices under
section 2 might produce a single liability-stage vote, three such votes if
heard by a three-judge trial court, or four or more such votes, depending
on the nature of the appeals that follow an initial judgment. An
appellate court unanimously affirming a trial judge’s violation vote
might signal a particularly egregious underlying practice, or it might
represent a close call affirmed based on the standard of appellate review.
An unappealed trial judge violation vote might represent a violation so
4. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 2, at 655–56; Katz, Not
Like the South, supra note 3, at 187, 210–13.
5. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 2, at 655–56; Katz, Not
Like the South, supra note 3, passim.
6. See Cox & Miles, supra note 1, at 5, 47 (arguing that coverage “is not a strong
predictor of liability in most section 2 cases,” and that the “estimated impact of section 5
coverage is small . . . and statistically insignificant”).
7. See id. at 5.

2008]

WHY COUNTING VOTES DOESN’T ADD UP

25

patent that appeal would have been futile, and yet it yields but one vote
compared with the four produced by a closer case affirmed on appeal.
The mere number of votes a lawsuit generates tells us nothing definitive
about the nature of the underlying practice or the region in which it
operated.
Judging the Voting Rights Act finds that some judges were more likely
to find liability than others. In particular, Cox and Miles find that
African American and Democratic judges were more likely to favor
liability than their white and Republican colleagues. These proclivities,
however, do not render the observed effect of coverage a mere
byproduct of race and party affiliation. That is, they do not explain the
greater proportion of successful section 2 claims found in covered
jurisdictions. Race and party could have such explanatory power only if
the judges most likely to favor liability were disproportionately located in
the covered regions. But Professors Cox and Miles do not argue that
they are so concentrated, and, in fact, they are not.8
Trials and Appeals: Judging the Voting Rights Act reports that trial
judges were more likely to vote for liability in covered jurisdictions than
in non-covered ones, but that appellate judges were not. Cox and Miles
seem to think that the difference they observed between trial level and
appellate votes is noteworthy, that it offers a “contrast” with our
findings, and reveals “complexity” and “nuance” our studies did not
acknowledge. But no contrast or unexpected complexity is operating
here.
To the extent that minority voters confront greater obstacles in
covered jurisdictions, one might perhaps reflexively assume that judges
at all levels would be more likely to cast votes for liability than their
counterparts in non-covered jurisdictions. But appellate judges differ
from trial judges in important ways. Trial judges are fact finders. Insofar
as minority voters confront greater or distinct obstacles to equal political
participation in covered jurisdictions, trial judges adjudicating claims in
these jurisdictions might well be more likely to make factual findings to
that effect and to reach judgments based on these facts than would trial
judges in non-covered regions. Judging the Voting Rights Act suggests that
trial judges may have done just that.
Opportunities for appellate judges to cast liability-stage votes hinge
8. African American judges cast 6.4%, or 16, of the 251 votes cast in covered
jurisdictions, and 6.1%, or 19, of the 310 votes cast in non-covered jurisdictions.
Democratic judges cast 41.8%, or 105, of the 251 votes in covered jurisdictions, and
43.2%, or 134, of 310 votes in non-covered regions. These proportions are statistically
equivalent. See infra Table 1.
Among trial judges, Democratic appointees cast 41.9%, or 39 of the 93 trial votes cast
in covered jurisdictions, compared with 44.2%, or 69 of 156 votes in non-covered regions,
and African American judges cast 8.6%, or 8 of the 93 covered trial votes, compared with
5.8%, or 9 of the 156 votes in non-covered jurisdictions. These proportions are
statistically equivalent. See infra Table 1.1.
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on a host of factors not tied directly to coverage or its absence. For
example, fifty-six trial votes produced no published appellate opinion.
To the extent that trial judgments most vulnerable to challenge are the
ones in fact appealed, appealing these fifty-six votes would plausibly have
yielded three additional votes affirming the underlying vote in each case.
Had these appeals materialized, covered jurisdictions would account for
a greater proportion of appellate votes finding liability than non-covered
regions.9 That these appeals did not materialize hardly suggests that
covered jurisdictions have fewer voting rights problems than noncovered ones. Instead, it highlights why the number of appellate votes
cast in a case reveals little about the underlying claim and the region in
which it originated.10
Affirmances and Reversals: Counting and examining votes rather than
judgments nevertheless reveals two insights about the Voting Rights Act
that Cox and Miles do not discuss. First, examining appellate votes to
affirm or reverse suggests that minority voters confront obstacles of even
greater severity and scope in covered jurisdictions than our original
studies suggest. Appellate courts in covered jurisdictions were both
more likely to reverse denials of liability and less likely to reverse
violations than were courts in non-covered regions.11 In other words,
defendants were more likely to win on appeal in non-covered regions,
while plaintiff-appeals were more likely to succeed in covered regions.
This suggests that trial judges in covered jurisdictions, if anything,
appear to have read section 2 too restrictively, and that the violations
identified in covered regions are more clear and less vulnerable to
challenge than those found elsewhere.
The Number of Votes: Examining section 2 votes rather than
judgments also offers a means to assess section 5’s deterrent effect in

9. Thirty-five of the 56 unappealed individual trial votes found a section 2 violation,
22 of which came from covered jurisdictions, 13 from non-covered. Translating these
votes into appellate affirmances adds 66 additional appellate votes finding liability in
covered regions, and 39 in non-covered. Translating the 21 unappealed trial votes that
found no violation into appellate affirmances adds 33 votes against liability in non-covered
regions, and 30 in covered. Adding these votes to the tally would mean that 43.7% of the
appellate votes cast in covered jurisdictions would have favored liability, compared with
38.5% in non-covered jurisdictions.
10. Our claim here is not, as Cox and Miles believe, that they “were wrong” to count
appellate votes in their study on judicial propensities. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J.
Miles, Documenting Discrimination?, 108 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 31, 33 (2008),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/108/31_CoxMiles.pdf. Instead, we
take issue with the use Cox and Miles makes of the count they produced. Simply put,
there is no reason to assume that tallying appellate votes on liability will produce the
same liability patterns observed when counting votes by trial judges, or, more
importantly, that it will mirror the proportion of overall judgments that find liability under
section 2. Our claim has consistently been that these judgments, and the findings that
support them, matter far more that the number of times individual judges happen to cast
liability votes in the course of a section 2 lawsuit.
11. See infra Table 2.

2008]

WHY COUNTING VOTES DOESN’T ADD UP

27

covered jurisdictions. Judges cast many more votes in non-covered
jurisdictions than in covered ones. They have done so because threejudge trial panels decided more than four times as many section 2 cases
in non-covered jurisdictions than in covered ones.12 Three-judge trial
panels are convened to hear challenges to the constitutionality of
statewide or congressional apportionment plans, and such challenges
were linked more often with section 2 claims in non-covered
jurisdictions. These challenges materialized more often in non-covered
jurisdictions precisely because section 5 does not operate in these
regions.
Only covered jurisdictions must obtain federal approval or
preclearance before implementing electoral changes. This requirement
has blocked implementation of numerous electoral practices in covered
regions, and thus eliminated the need for plaintiffs to challenge these
practices under section 2.
For example, since 1982, the Justice Department has denied
preclearance to dozens of districting plans of the type that, if challenged
under section 2, would have been most likely to be heard by a threejudge panel.13 Covered jurisdictions adjusted many others in order to
meet the section 5 hurdle,14 which had been interpreted until 1997 to
require that all proposed changes comply with section 2.15 As a result,
section 5 objections and adjustments made in anticipation of such
objections vastly reduced the likelihood that separate section 2
challenges would follow.16 No such screening occurred in non-covered
jurisdictions; hence many more three-judge trial panels were convened.
Section 5’s screening effect produced the lopsided number of votes
cast by three-judge panels in non-covered jurisdictions, and, more
generally, the disproportionate number of votes cast in non-covered
regions. All else being equal, proportionally fewer section 2 violations
should be found in covered jurisdictions than in non-covered ones
12. See infra Tables 1, 3.
13. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, About Section 5 of
the
Voting
Rights
Act
(Jan.
2,
2008),
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/obj_activ.htm (listing objections to various
redistricting plans by state, including 1 objection in Alabama, 1 in Arkansas, 1 in Arizona,
2 in Florida, 4 in Georgia, 2 in Mississippi, 1 in New Mexico, 2 in New York, 2 in North
Carolina, 1 in South Carolina, 2 in Texas, and 2 in Virginia).
14. See Luis Ricardo Fraga & Maria Lizet Ocampo, More Information Requests and
the Deterrent Effect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization of 2006, supra note 3, at 47, 56; Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared:
Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 Houston L. Rev. 1,
23–24 (2007).
15. Ellen D. Katz, Mission Accomplished?, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 142 (2007), at
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/12/10/katz.html
[hereinafter
Katz,
Mission
Accomplished?].
16. See Ellen D. Katz, Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance: A Response to
Professor Karlan, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 33, 37 n.12 (2007); see also Karlan, supra note 15, at
31; Katz, Not Like the South, supra note 3, at 209–10 & nn.128, 135.
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where, by definition, preclearance does not operate. But this is not the
case.17 Section 2 plaintiffs were more likely to succeed and in fact
succeeded more often in covered jurisdictions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our studies on section 2 litigation suggest that covered jurisdictions
indeed “have more voting rights problems” than do non-covered ones.
Our studies, of course, cannot prove definitively that this is so. Section 2
litigation offers a lens through which to examine opportunities for
minority political participation in covered and non-covered jurisdictions,
but this lens—as we have repeatedly recognized18—is imperfect. It
requires that cases be brought, resources devoted to their prosecution,
and merits decisions be both reached and published for review. To the
extent that any of these factors varied systematically between covered
and non-covered jurisdictions, a distorted portrait of political
participation would have emerged from published section 2 decisions.
Cox and Miles, however, have identified nothing that suggests any such
distortion. If anything, a careful examination of votes by individual
judges reveals section 2 litigation to be a more precise lens through
which to study minority political participation than even we had
suspected.

17. See Katz, Mission Accomplished?, supra note 15.
18. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 2, at 734; Katz, Not Like
the South, supra note 3, at 214; Katz, Mission Accomplished?, supra note 15.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: VIOLATION VOTES BY JUDGES’ RACE, PARTY, AND TYPE OF
JURISDICTION
Covered

Non-Covered

Violations

Votes

Violation
Rate

Violations

Votes

Violation
Rate

White*
African
American

73

235

31.1%

89

291

30.6%

12

16

75.0%

13

19

68.4%

Total

85

251

33.9%

102

310

32.9%

Republican**

38

146

26.0%

44

176

25.0%

Democrat**

47

105

44.8%

58

134

43.3%

Total

85

251

33.9%

102

310

32.9%

* Latino and Asian American included in White total, per Cox-Miles methodology
** Party refers to the party of the appointing president.
Note 1: Chi-Square value for total votes of African American/White vs. Covered/NonCovered was .012 (p = .913)
Note 2: Chi-Square value for total votes of Republican/Democrat vs. Covered/NonCovered was .077 (p=.781)

TABLE 1.1: VIOLATION VOTES BY TRIAL JUDGES’ RACE, PARTY, AND TYPE OF
JURISDICTION
Covered

White*
African
American

Non-Covered

Violations

Votes

Violation
Rate

Violations

Votes

Violation
Rate

32

85

37.6%

48

147

32.7%

8

8

100.0%

6

9

66.7%

Total***

40

93

43.0%

54

156

34.6%

Republican**

16

54

29.6%

24

87

27.6%

Democrat**

24

39

61.5%

30

69

43.5%

Total***

40

93

43.0%

54

156

34.6%

* Latino and Asian American included in White total, per Cox-Miles methodology
** Party refers to the party of the appointing president.
*** Total includes all trial judge votes, from solo and three-judge panel trials.
Note 1: Chi-Square value for total votes of African American/White vs. Covered/NonCovered was .735 (p = .391)
Note 2: Chi-Square value for total votes of Republican/Democrat vs. Covered/NonCovered was .125 (p=.724)
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TABLE 2: EFFECT OF TRIAL OUTCOME AND COVERAGE ON APPEAL AND
REVERSAL RATES (MARGINAL EFFECTS PROBIT)
All Trial-Level Votes
Variable

Appealed

Violation Vote = “Yes”
Section 5 Coverage
Violation Vote = “Yes”& Section 5 Coverage
Challenge to At-Large Election
Challenge To Reapportionment Plan
Challenge to Local Election Practice
Plaintiffs were African American
Log-Likelihood
Psuedo-R2

Reversed

– .190 **
(.094)
.028
(.106)
–.179
(.155)
.006
(.126)
– .003
(.119)
– .034
(.093)
.195 *
(.111)

.510 **
(.123)
.281 **
(.130)
– .348 **
(.056)
– .334 **
(.133)
.031
(.147)
.334 **
(.117)
– .124
(.199)

– 133.213

– 64.051

.1295

.2131

* Significant at p < 0.10
** Significant at p < 0.05
DV: Appeals and Reversals
Note: Reversal Rates are Conditional on Appeals (non-appealed verdicts aren’t included
as 0’s).

TABLE 3: VIOLATION VOTES BY LEVEL AND JURISDICTION
Covered
Violation
Votes
Trial
3-Judge Panel

Total
Votes

Non-Covered
Violation
Rate

Violation
Votes

Total
Votes

Violation
Rate

33

75

44.0%

24

75

32.0%

7

18

38.9%

30

81

37.0%

Appellate

45

158

28.5%

48

154

31.2%

Total

85

251

33.9%

102

310

32.9%

Note: Three-judge panels decided 6 cases in covered jurisdictions and 27 cases in noncovered jurisdictions. The Chi-square value obtained by comparing convened cases in
single-judge/three-judge-panel vs. covered/non-covered was 11.1 (p < .001.)

Preferred Citation: Ellen D. Katz & Anna Baldwin, Why Counting Votes
Doesn’t Add Up: A Response to Cox and Miles’ Judging the Voting Rights
Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 23 (2008), http://www.columbialaw
review.org/Sidebar/volume/108/23_KatzBaldwin.pdf.

